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Abstract
Most of the critical aspects for secure and dependable systems, such as safety,
integrity, availability, are related to uncertainty. Literature proposes many ap-
proaches to deal with uncertainty, mainly in the area of risk management and
safety&reliability engineering. However, what is still missing is a clear under-
standing of the nature of uncertainty that very often has produced mistreatments in
the design. In this paper, we propose a conceptual model for uncertainty that can
be used to deal with systems’ qualities such as security and dependability. Partic-
ularly, we will consider the relation between uncertainty-risk and how risk affects
several quality attributes of the system. This understanding is necessary for the
evaluation of design alternatives. We use a case study in Air Traffic Management
to illustrate our approach.
1 Introduction
Software systems are assuming more and more a critical role in our daily life and this
introduces the need for software developers to deal more deeply with problems related
to security and dependability (S&D) issues. Several approaches have been proposed
in literature to develop secure and dependable systems [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and almost all of
them focus on how preserve their properties in all possible situations. Avizienis et al.
[1] proposed a taxonomy to clarify the basic concepts of security and dependability that
can be considered complementary to what proposed in [2, 6]. Both, however, consider
risk as an uncertain event that produces a negative impact into the system [7] and that
may obstruct its normal behaviour. Consequently, risks have to be identified as soon
as possible in the software development process so to introduce treatments directly as
part of the design.
Techniques based on ontologies and taxonomies, such as [4] and [3], have been
proposed in literature to identify risk, but unfortunately they have not produced signifi-
cant results for designing of secure and dependable systems. The main problem here is
about how to assess likelihood and severity of risk and what kind of treatment has to be
introduced to make risk acceptable for the overall design. In the dependability research
community, Fault Tree Model (FTA) [5] is used to structure how a failure occurs and
finally to assess the probability of the failure occurrence. FTA uses probability theory
to compute the probability of failure. Similarly, in the security area the attack graph [8]
is proposed to model how an attack is conducted and following Bayes Network rules
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what is its probability. All these approaches analyse and assess uncertain events (i.e.,
risks, attacks, faults, errors) in terms of the likelihood. The common idea is to ensure
the system is “good enough” in preserving its security and dependability under uncer-
tainty conditions. However, there is not a clear understanding about which uncertain
events one should consider. We can consider, for example, different events like
• a controller fails after 10 days of operation and this happens in 90% of cases;
• 30% of software code introduces vulnerabilities;
• a controller is hot.
All these events can be considered as risks for a system, but each of them has a different
nature of uncertainty, and consequently introduce specific needs in terms of treatment.
The first one refers to the of variability of the controller [9], the second to the lack of
knowledge [10] in detecting the vulnerability of code, and the third one to an imprecise
definition of “being hot”.
In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework to model and analyse risk within
the context of security and dependability. We clarify about different natures of uncer-
tainty (i.e., aleatory, epistemic, and fuzziness/impreciseness) and how they influence
properties of security and dependability. The models, we propose, can be used by an
analyst to identify risks and evaluate their impact over the system according to their
nature. Since security and dependability are aggregation of different quality attributes
(e.g., availability, confidentiality, integrity, etc.), in our approach the risk assessment
must be conducted from different dimensions.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Initially, we present our under-
standing about basic concepts of security and dependability. We identify several types
of uncertainties (Section 3. We propose a generic framework for risk assessment that
is able to accommodate all types of uncertainty. (Section 4). Finally, we discuss our
proposal and draw some remarks (Section 5).
2 Security and Dependability: Basic Concepts
In this section, we clarify our understanding about security and dependability as quality
attributes. Starting from two US-DoD standards: Orange Book [11] and Failure-Modes
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [12] that are considered referential works for S&D
engineering community.
2.1 Quality Attributes
In Fig. 1, we propose a taxonomy for security and dependability as quality attributes. It
is mainly based on the work of Avizienis et al. [1] and extended with other approaches
proposed in [2, 13, 6, 14].
Information security [15] is refined into confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
according to the ISO/IEC 1335 [16] we consider also authenticity and accountability.
Dependability is defined as an aggregation of availability, reliability, integrity, safety,
and maintainability [1]. The definition of these concepts are defined as follows:
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Dependability
Security
Adaptability
Reliability
Availability
Recoverability
Safety
Maintainability
Manageability
Augmentability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Accountability
Scalability
Survivability
required
required
Responsiveness
Accessability
Authenticity
Upgradability
required
required
required
required
required
required
Figure 1: Security and Dependability Properties
• Availability is a readiness of a system (or a component) to perform its function-
alities. This attribute can be achieved by five ways:
– High reliability - continuity of providing correct service for a specific pe-
riod;
– Short recovery - repairing the system from a failure and restoring to the
“good” condition before the failure occurs;
– High survivability - delivering the functionalities under attacks/failures;
– High accessibility - accessible by users in delivering the functionalities;
– High responsiveness - users receive the response in timely manner.
Responsiveness and accessibility attributes are more to users’ perception and not
solely depending on the systems [17].
• Confidentiality - the information can only be accessed by authorized agents;
• Integrity - the absence of unauthorized/improper system alterations. It also sub-
sumes the absence of data modification without authorization;
• Authenticity - ensuring the validity of a subject identity;
• Accountability - ability of a system tracing back any actions;
• Maintainability - features that allows us to change the system after it is delivered
and used. As in [1, 6], maintainability is refined into more fine-grained qualities:
– Manageability represents the easiness in managing the system;
– Recoverability (i.e., the same as the one at the availability);
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– Augmentability is the easiness to upgrade the system due to the obsolete or
scalable problem;
– Adaptability is the easiness to adjust the system according to the environ-
ment situation
• Safety depicts the absence of catastrophic consequence to users/environment.
Notice that these qualities are inter-related each other. A “required” relation indicates
that to realizing a property (e.g., safety) the system requires another property (e.g.,
reliability) to be guaranteed also. Here, we note only minimal required-relations, be-
cause there could be a circumstance where safety requires other properties than the one
depicted in Fig. 1. Composition relations (diamond arrows) depicted that a property,
actually, is a composition from several other properties. For instance, to realise a safe
system, analysts should design the system, at least, having highly reliable system, short
recovery time, and making the system able to preserve its integrity. For having an ac-
countable system, the system is required to have authentication mechanisms and to be
able preserving the integrity of audit trails.
S&D attributes are related also to other quality attributes of the systems (e.g., us-
ability, performance). For example, the security of a system usually make the system
less usable by the users. However, in this situation analysts, often, capture the
relation among attributes using causal-effect [18] or contribution relation [19] which is
conceptually inappropriate. Indeed, there is a relationship between safety and limited-
usability but it is only correlation, and not contribution nor causal-effect one. It is
because the “cause” of having limited-usability is depending on the security mecha-
nism, that is chosen, and not the state of being secure. In other word, there could be
a mechanism which does not limit the system usability. For example, a system should
sustain against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (security). Applying a firewall that
result in limiting users’ access is surely will secure the system and also limiting the
usability. Conversely, having Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is able to mitigate DoS
attacks without limiting users’ access.
2.2 “The Attributes” of S&D systems
As emerging from literature, reliability, confidentiality, integrity, and recoverability are
the “most” important S&D properties.1. In the following, we demonstrate how-to other
S&D quality attributes can be reduced to these four properties.
Example 1. To maintain the availability of an ATM system, analysts should ensure that
the system has high reliability and require short-period for recovering from failures.
Though we do not assess the accessibility and responsiveness, we may still argue
about the availability of the system. However, the availability is often measured by
the percentage of operated-time over a period-time. In this way, a reliable system may
result in a low frequency of downtime, and a recoverable system allows us to have a
short-period for each downtime.
1In this work, we mainly focus on the first three quality attributes
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Example 2. To ensure the safety of an aircraft, controllers require the sustained cor-
rect assistance (i.e., reliable and recoverable) of an ATM system, and only authorized
personnels are allowed to access the system (i.e., integrity)
Notice, other aspects of an available system (i.e., reachability, responsibility, or
survivability) are not sufficient to guarantee the safety operation in ATM. For instance,
a high survivability system means the system keeps running though an attack/an error
occurs. Actually, it is dangerous for the safety because the system usually runs in a
degraded mode where the result is not 100% correct, and can give mislead information
to the controllers.
Example 3. For authentication purposes, each controller has different ratings that in-
dicates their experiences. A Novice controller should not be allowed to manage a
highly-dense airspace (e.g., approach/TRACON sectors). For this end, an ATM system
should authenticate the users before they use the system.
This setting requires the system to be provided with an access control (i.e., authen-
tication mechanisms and authorization managements). In [13], the authors mentioned
that there are three means to authenticate users: 1) by what users know - password, 2)
by what users have - card, and 3) by what users are - biometric. Besides ensuring the
reliability of the access control, to guarantee the authentication the system should pre-
serve the confidentiality of authentication means (e.g., passwords, cards) and preserve
their integrity against illegal modification. When the integrity of authentication means
is compromised, the authenticity of users are doubtful though the access control still
runs correctly.
Example 4. Controllers’ actions should be accountable, especially, during an aircraft
action. An ATM system always produces audit-trails for every actions of controllers
and conversations between controllers and pilots. These trails is useful to perform an
investigation for any incidents/accidents.
To guarantee this property, the system should provide: 1) an authentication mech-
anism to ensure the authenticity of controllers and 2) maintain the integrity of the audit
trails from illegal modifications or fabrications [13].
Finally, these reductions, into four main qualities, are useful to reduce the number
of assessments required by a system. However, it may overlook on capturing partic-
ular attacks or incidents (e.g., DoS attack). In that attack, the system is still reliable
and consequently does not require any recovery but it is not available to users. For
maintainability issues, we believe it is hardly possible to reduce them into reliabil-
ity, confidentiality, integrity, and recoverability properties. Ideally, the maintainability
should be inherent as main principles in developing the system that should be keep in
mind by the developers (i.e., analysts, designers).
3 The Nature of Uncertainty
In standards like [7, 20], risk is defined as the combination of the probability (uncer-
tainty) of an event and its (negative) consequences. In other words, risks have two
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properties: uncertainty and severity. An event, which is certain or has no negative
impacts to the system, should not be considered as risk, but more as problem.
... Uncertainties appear everywhere. ... When using a mathematical model careful
attention must be given to uncertainties in the model. - R. P. Feymann 2
Besides assessing events’ impacts, it is essential to know the uncertainty associated to
an event and what is its nature. Several works have been proposed about the nature of
uncertainty [21, 22, 23, 24]. In [23], the authors argue that essentially uncertainty are
divided into two classes: aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. The former is induced by
randomness, and the latter is due to incomplete knowledge. In another paper, Smith-
son [22], argues that uncertainties is introduced because of vagueness. Uncertainty is
resulted from ambiguity, vagueness (or impreciseness), and probability. In this paper,
we consider uncertainties into three classes: aleatory, epistemic, and imprecise.
Uncertainty is always present though one perceives having a complete knowledge.
For instance, we know all about a dice including possible outcomes, but still we cannot
decide for certain the outcome of rolling a dice. In this example, we can categorise the
event of rolling dice is exposed to an aleatory uncertainty induced from the nature of
aleatory (i.e., variability and randomness).
Example 5. The radar engineers have, almost, full knowledge how a radar work, but
they still put another radar as a backup because the main radar might still fail.
This class of uncertainty is heavily studied in the dependability community. Typ-
ically, the uncertainty arises due to spatial variation (e.g., the development site is dif-
ferent with the runtime site), temporal fluctuation, and development variability. Since
this uncertainty may result in failures, analysts should investigate all possible uncertain
events in this class. The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [9] or fault tree analy-
sis (FTA) [5] are useful in assessing the level of uncertainty. However, they cannot
reduce the uncertainty. To deal with such uncertainties, redundancy techniques [25]
(e.g., primary-secondary, main-backup, multi-version programming) are used to deal
with these events.
Epistemic uncertainty is caused by incomplete knowledge.
Example 6. Aircraft hand-off procedures to adjacent sectors might fail though the
ATM system operates normally. It is because analysts do not have complete knowledge
about all possible actions that a controller will do for handing-off an aircraft.
Most of security problems are arisen because of the incompleteness. Security ana-
lysts are hardly possible aware of all possible threats that attackers might launch to the
system. Essentially, there are two subtypes of epistemic uncertainty: 1) visible incom-
pleteness where we are aware about what we do not know, and 2) blind incompleteness
where we are not aware about what we don not know. The example 6 is one example
of visible incompleteness. Essentially, it can be reduced by empirical efforts, such as:
interviews, collect more data, expert judgements, etc.
2in Appendix F - Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (In
compliance with Executive Order 12546 of February 3, 1986), NASA, 1986
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Example 7. In smart-card technology, attackers can extract secret keys and conse-
quently compromise the integrity of smart-card by analysing the power consumption
of a smart-card [26].
In this setting, analysts never had got an idea how such possibilities existed. Es-
sentially, there is no such mechanism to reduce this subtype of uncertainty. Having
a system with high augmentability is beneficial for this uncertainty because it should
allow us to easily upgrade the system as soon as a vulnerability is discovered. Both
types of uncertainty are also introducing risks to the system, but they require different
treatments to reduce/to deal with the nature of their uncertainty.
The last class is imprecise uncertainty which is introduced due to imprecision.
The imprecision can be caused by un-clear definition (e.g., ambiguity, vagueness) or
the limitation of measurement/assessment techniques. In other words, this uncertainty
may expose an object together previous uncertainties.
Example 8. Analysts should be able to assess the severity of the hand-off failure.
How analysts can come up with the precise value? It is common if the result is just
a vague figure. In other situations, the fuzziness is introduced due to the limitation of
the techniques.
Example 9. To reduce uncertainties of the event in example 6, ones may conduct
interviews to some controllers (defined by a statistical sampling technique).
However, the outcome of the interviews still contains the uncertainty (called error)
due to the limitation of the techniques. Essentially, the imprecise uncertainty is not the
source of risks, but they play a role in defining the extent of risks. In other words, the
fuzziness is not a risk source, unlike the aleatory and the epistemic ones, but it is a risk
factor.
In the next section, we propose a framework that incorporates, almost, all uncer-
tainties. We believe incorporating those uncertainties in one framework will result in
a better understanding about the complexity of problems, especially in S&D context,
besides improving the result of analysis and design.
4 Toward a Generic Framework for Secure and De-
pendable Risks Assessment
A framework is a basic structure that is used to solve or to address complex issues.
Ideally, a framework is composed of models, analysis techniques, a process to develop
and analyse models, and tools (optional) to assist the framework users. In this paper, we
present our revised modelling framework, namely the Goal-Risk framework [27], that
has been developed for a general risk analysis. We intend to improve the GR framework
to make it more suitable for S&D systems. Moreover, It allows us to capture “most”
of uncertainties and not solely analyses the technical systems. However, the wisdom
of risk management is how to suppress risks that prevents organizations/enterprise in
generating values [20]. Therefore, our proposal aims to provide analysts in managing
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S&D risks at the organization level by considering both aspects socio and technical
systems. By means of the model, analysts and stakeholders are able to collaborate
easily in managing risk.
Example 10. Controller supervisors suppose to be aware about the possible opera-
tional risks of the system integrity. However, S&D analysts know about the reliability
of radar systems, but they are not well informed how the organization (i.e., Air Traffic
Service Provider) perceived possible failures, especially in terms of possible cash-flow
disturbance or any legal issues that the organization may face.
One may argue that S&D risks is the “usual” risks in an enterprise (e.g., financial
risk, legal risk, environmental risk, operational risk, image risk). In our experiences,
S&D risks are, indeed, alike with those risks. One particularity is security risks adhere
to malicious intent which rarely considers in the conventional risk analysis - especially
in operational risks. Most of S&D risks are exposed to three types of uncertainty as
mentioned before, and they trigger other “usual” risks. Moreover, some S&D risks
may not emerge as visible phenomena until an exhaustive audit conducted (e.g., Enron
company scandals), or even they emerge as a result of the system functionalities (e.g.,
John Rusnak scandals [28]). Finally, there is no absolute such secure and dependable
system because it is hardly possible and makes the system so expensive or hard to use.
Therefore, the framework should allow analysts to perform a trade-off analysis over
several criteria they are interested.
4.1 Metamodel for the S&D Risk Model
Surveying different risk management approaches across domain applications (e.g., safety-
critical [12, 5, 9], security-critical [29, 30], financial [31], enterprise management
[20, 32]) we came up with the metamodel depicted in Fig. 2.
Starting from risk, we define it as an uncertain event that produces (negative) im-
pacts to assets [7]. In our framework, we extend the notion assets beyond resources
that are valuable for the organization. In [33], we categorize risks into three cate-
gories: risks threaten resources, risk threaten business processes/tasks, and risk ob-
structs the achievement of strategic objectives/goals. Events are perceived as normal
circumstances that occur in a given time and place [34] or failures in a system. Failures
might occur due to malicious intents - attacks (e.g., wiretapping) or just accidental ac-
tions - accidents (e.g., filling the wrong values). Basically, an attack (or accident) is a
threat (or incident) that exploits (or activates) vulnerabilities/faults in the system. If we
can fully control (i.e., protect or remove) all the system’s vulnerabilities, then we may
reach the “absolute” security and dependably [13]. The main differences between a
threat and an incident are a threat should have three components: attacker(s)/agent(s),
motivation(s), and means(s) while an incident does not necessarily have all those com-
ponents.
Besides attackers, we consider other three relevant roles: risk owner, risk source,
and risk controller [35, 20]. For a particular risk, these roles are not necessarily played
by same actors3. Essentially, risk owners are affected actors in case a failure occurs.
3Actors [36] includes both human agents and technical systems
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Figure 2: Metamodel for Secure and Dependable Risk Model
In other words, the owners may not being the ones that require the assets [37]. Risk
sources are actors that provide the assets that contain vulnerabilities (e.g., provider
[37]) or actors that triggers vulnerability of the system. Risk controllers are actors that
are responsible to mitigate the risk in terms of reducing its likelihood or alleviating its
severity.
Example 11. Consider the mis-entry risk of an aircraft flight-plan. The owner of the
risk is air traffic controllers. A flight-data processor (FDP) is the source of risk because
it is the place where the vulnerability lays. However, Air traffic planners are also the
source because they are the ones that trigger an incident that result in an accident by
activating the vulnerability in the FDP. To reduce the likelihood, supervisors act as the
risk controller that monitors all new entries flight-plan.
4.2 S&D Risk Modelling Framework
In this subsection, we refine the metamodel of the Goal-Risk (GR) modelling frame-
work [27, 38] in the light of our findings mentioned in (sub)sections 2.2, 3, and 4.1.
In Fig. 2, we present the mapping for representing the S&D risk assessment concepts
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S&D Risk Concepts GR Constructs
Asset Goal, Task, Resource
Vulnerability Inherent in Goal,Task, Resource
Risk
Impact Impact Relation
Event Event
Threat
Attacker ”Bad” Actor
Motivation ”Anti” Goal
Means ”Malicious” Task
Treatment Task
Mitigation Alleviation or Contribution Relation
Risk Owner ”requester” Actor
Risk Source ”provider” Actor or “trigger” actor
Risk Controller ”controller” Actor
Table 1: Mapping S&D Risk Metamodel and GR Metamodel
using the GR modelling framework in Tab. 1.
Unlike other works based on Tropos/i* [39, 30, 40] that model security as goals, the
GR models security and dependability as properties (i.e., reliability, confidentiality, and
integrity) of each concept which is needed to be satisfied. In this way, the difference
between stakeholders’ interests and S&D properties is more apparent and not because
the “label” refers to functionality or S&D.
Essentially, a GR model is composed of three conceptual layers: asset, event, and
treatment layer. The asset layer captures “things” that are able to generate values
for the actor which are depicted in terms of goals, tasks, and resources. Goals (de-
picted as ovals) represent the objectives that actors intend to achieve. Tasks (depicted
as hexagons) are course of actions used to achieve goals or treat events. Resources
(depicted as rectangles are artefacts that are required to achieve goals or to perform
tasks. Moreover, resources can be resulted from the execution of tasks. The event layer
depicts uncertain events that can affect the asset layer 4. The treatment layer represents
a set of additional measures, depicted as tasks, to mitigate risks (i.e., their likelihood or
impacts).
Initially, we only concentrate on assessing the risk of assets’ reliability. It aims
at ensuring assets will operate correctly to achieve the top goals of each stakeholders.
The scene presented in Example 11 are captured by a GR model as depicted in Fig. 3.
In that setting (i.e., the risk of unreliable Flight Plan), Controller is the one that own
this risk. Typically, the decision on whether treating risks or not is driven by the owner.
In this setting, supervisor acts as risk controller which is responsible to confirm new
entries of flight plan by aiming at reducing the likelihood of mis-entry of “null” flight
ID. The risk can be triggered by an attack launched by an attacker or simply accidents
(e.g., Random Failure FDP Server or Mis-entry of“null” flight ID).
Essentially, both uncertain events activate/exploit the vulnerability at flight plan5.
4The GR model allows us to model risks (events with negative impacts) and opportunities (events with
positive impacts)
5In [41], the authors presented the way to represent explicitly the vulnerability by annotating the resource
10
Controller
Provide 
Instruction to 
Aircraft
Monitor Air 
Traffic
Decide Aircraft 
Airways
Communicate 
with Pilot
Read 
Flight Plan
Flight Plan
Flight Data 
Processor
Random Failure 
FDP Server
Flight PlanPlanner
Mis-entry of 
"null" flight ID
Work Understress 
Condition
Work in 
Maximum 
Capacity
Attacker
Injecting "null" 
flight ID
Shutdown Flight 
Data Service
Fault 
Injection
Thunderbolt 
hit FDP power 
grid
SupervisorConfirm new entry of 
Flight Plan
AND
-- 
+ 
+ 
++ 
-- 
- 
De
- 
-- 
Risk Owner
Risk Source
Risk Source
Risk Controler
Attacker
Motivation
Means
AttackAccident
Accident
Incident
Asset
Where the 
vulnerability
lays
Asset
Asset
Asset
Accident
Treatment
TaskResource
Goal
Subgoal 1 Subgoal 2
Goal 1 Goal 2
Decomposition Relation
Contribution Relation
Means-End Relation
Event Reource Impact Relation
LEGEND
/OR
Mitigation
Alleviation Relation
AND
+/-
+/-
- 
Figure 3: The GR model in Capturing Reliability Risks
Attacks are characterised by attackers, motivation (shutdown Flight Data Proces-
sor), and means Fault Injection). In contrast, accidents happen without any motiva-
tions; trigger for normal activities (e.g., mis-entry of “null” flight ID) or random events
(e.g., random failures of FDP server, Thunderbolt hit the FDP power grid). Notice there
should not be any “positive contribution” from the actor’s goals/tasks to incidents.
Indeed a goal (e.g., working in maximum capacity) can increase the likelihood of an
accident, but it is not a direct contribution. There must be an intermediate event (in
ATM domain is called by incident) in between. As far as there is a mechanism that
suppresses the occurrence of the incident, then the goal achievement will not increase
the accident likelihood.
In the context of assessing confidentiality and integrity, we use a similar approach
taken for the reliability. Those attributes are represented as a tag (e.g., “I” or “C”) for
the asset layer as depicted in Fig. 3. Unlike reliability, not all assets are confidential/integrity-
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Figure 4: The GR model in Capturing Confidential and Integrity Risk
sensitive. This tagging process can be done by stakeholders and later refined by ana-
lysts. Likewise Impact relation, an integrity impact is depicted using “dash-line ending
by box”, and a confidential impact is depicted by “dash-line ending by diamond”. Both
relations also indicate their severity with a label (−,−−).
Confidentiality risks only threaten resources (not goals and tasks) while integrity
risks can expose all types of assets. Moreover, confidentiality are prone to risks resulted
from attacks, while an integrity breach can be resulted from the normal operation.
Example 12. The event mistype flight ID may result in the breach of the flight data
integrity. However, the event might be caused by a normal operation of a planner who
is careless.
By means of this model, ones can model S&D risks particularly reliable, confiden-
tial, and integrity. Each quality is characterised by the likelihood and total expected
loss6 However, those three qualities are exposed to the three types of uncertainty ex-
plained in Section 3. To represent such uncertainties, each constructs are quantified in
terms of its evidence (supporting, opposing) to be correctly operated adapting from the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence.
Sati +Deni +Xi + Yi = 1; i ∈ Graph nodes7
For the complete calculus of this mathematical model, readers may read [42]. In con-
trast with Probability Theory, here the opposing evidence (denial) cannot be calcu-
lated from the supporting evidence (satisfaction) (i.e., deni 6= 1 − sati). Moreover,
6Notice that each assets has a value. Loss is the sum-up of the loss of value.
7Sati ≥ 0;Deni ≥ 0;Xi ≥ 0;Yi ≥ 0
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we model the lack of knowledge-Xi and conflicting of knowledge-Yi that are required
for epistemic uncertainty.
If an event is only exposed to the aleatory nature, we can assume that there is no
lack and conflicting knowledge (i.e., deni = 1 − sati). For epistemic uncertainty,
analysts do not have complete knowledge about the event therefore sati + deni ≤ 1
and the reminder (1−sati−deni = Xi) can be perceived as the lack of knowledge. By
means of the automated reasoner (adapted from [19, 38]), the model obtains the final
evidence values. Principally, each relation in the GR model propagates the evidence
from source nodes to final nodes following defined semantics [38, 42]. At final, each
node has the final evidence for each attributes.
Example 13. Based on Fig. 3, initially the attack injecting “null” flight ID has 50%
sat evidence that it will be launched. At the end, the attack injecting “null” flight ID
has sat = 0.4, den = 0.5, and Y = 0.1.
Notice at initial analysts assesses the sat only and not talking about denial of the
attack. Therefore, ones may assume that the analysts do not have any information for
the reminder (X = 0.5). The example 13 indicates that at the end the sat is lower than
the initial one. It might be due to the fact that the attacker is not “really” motivated to
shutdown flight data service (den=0.6). Since it is impossible to have the sum of
evidence bigger than 1, one may assume there is conflicting evidence (Y = 0.1).
Based on those final values, ones may compute how much the likelihood (λ) of
“things” occurs (i.e., goals to be achieved, tasks to be executed, resources to be pro-
vided, and events occur). In this framework, if an event is exposed only by aleatory
then λ = sat. If events (and also goals, tasks, resources) are exposed in epistemic one
(i.e., X 6= 0 or Y 6= 0) then the likelihood is a imprecise value. In this framework, we
define it as a range:
beli ≤ λi ≤ plai8; i ∈ Graph nodes
beli =
{
Sati, if i is a risk/bad thing;
Sati − [[Xi − Yi]], otherwise9.
plai =
{
Sati +Xi + Yi, if i is a risk/bad thing;
Sati, otherwise.
Essentially, the belief beli assumes at the “at least” value for evidence while the
plausibility plai assumes at the “most” value one. By means this representation, ones
can see the (un)fuzziness of the evidence of a goal and decide how much mitigation are
required accordingly.
8It is specified following the similar notion on belief and plausibility in the Dempster-Shafer Theory
[43]
9[[x]] = X if x ≥ 0, otherwise [[x]] = 0
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By means of the model and its formalization, analysts can understand what are
risks associated to the system and assess them. Moreover, they can also understand
how to reduce the uncertainty, according to its nature, of risk and how to mitigate the
risk [27]. For instance, if a risk (or an opportunity) has a wide-range (imprecise) of
likelihood (e.g., 20%-70%) then it is better if the treatment is elicitated based on the
biggest (smallest) value. In the case of incomplete knowledge of an event, analysts can
perform some empirical efforts (e.g., interviews, expert judgements) to reduce the lack
of knowledge or to minimise the conflict of knowledge about the event. Consequently,
these efforts may reduce the uncertainty about the event. Imprecise uncertainty is the
only type that may not result in risk. It depends on the sensitivity of the system towards
the imprecision aspect.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed about basic concepts of security and dependability
proposed in literature and how they are related to uncertainty. We have explained how
S&D quality attributes can be reduced to reliability, confidentiality, integrity, and re-
coverability qualities. We have proposed a modelling framework that captures critical
concepts of having a S&D system (e.g., assets, attack, accident, failures, treatment) and
reason about related risk from three different dimensions (namely, reliability, confiden-
tiality, and integrity). The nature of uncertainty is used along the assessment process
and is used to find the most appropriate treatment for risk mitigation. Moreover, one
may perform a cost-benefit analysis [44] over a GR model to maximise the effective-
ness of cost for countermeasures in achieving those three attributes using the forward
reasoning [38]. For enrichment, trade-off analysis [41] can be conducted using a GR
model to see the trade-off among attributes for a given set of treatments.
Currently, our approach is able to capture and analyse some parts of availability
property (i.e., reliability, recoverability) [33]. However, it cannot deal with the in-
terruption (e.g., Denial-of-Service) because in this case the system runs correctly (reli-
able) but it is not accessible by end-users. Our model elicit “necessary” evidence for the
availability of a system, but further analyses (i.e., responsiveness) are required to ensure
the availability. In this paper, we model and analyse necessary conditions to be secure
and dependable, but unfortunately it is not, surely, sufficient (i.e., if there both condi-
tions are different). In fact, it is hardly possible to have sufficient evidence/condition to
judge whether the system is secure or not. Security engineering, often, conducts with
lack of knowledge. For instance, our firewall can filter all malicious traffic now, but not
necessarily the case for next week. It is due to the nature of the quality attributes which
their breaches are not necessarily appeared by users and always increase over the time.
The value of X or Y refers to the incomplete knowledge of the analysts about
the subject. Ideally, they should try to reduce those values using some techniques as
indicated in the Section 3. However, those techniques cannot be counted as mitigation.
It is aiming at increasing the preciseness of the assessment, and at the end it may reduce
the possibility of “over-shoot” in adopting countermeasures (i.e., reduce the cost of
countermeasures).
Analysts should try to remove the vulnerability that lay in the system. In [45, 37, 3],
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the authors proposed structure ways to identify vulnerabilities and possible removals.
However, we realise it is impossible to remove all vulnerabilities. Therefore, a set of
means is necessary to mitigate risks: prevention, detection-recovery, alleviation, and
restoration. Prevention means aims at preventing the exploitation/activation of those
vulnerabilities. Detection-recovery means aim at detecting the present of intrusions
or errors and try to recover the system from them. Alleviation intends to reduce the
severity of failures resulted from attack or accident. Finally, analysts should provide
means to perform restoration after failures. Here, we distinguish between restoration
and recovery. Restoration recovers the system from failures while recovery is aiming
at recovering from errors. However, in many cases they are alike. In some setting,
we may transfer the risks into the third party (e.g., insurance companies) which can be
seen as part of the mitigation strategies.
As mention in the previous section, risk controller and risk owner can be different
actors. It might be the case that the controller does not perceive a risk as greater as the
owner. This situation may result in agreed countermeasure are not executed because
the controller perceives less risky than the one that owner does. Therefore, further
analyses are required to ensure that the perceived risks do not significantly deviate
from the actual ones.
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